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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AN INFANT'S RIGHT
TO A TRIAL BY JURY*
'The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate' are
the words of the Bill of Rights, and no act of the
Legislature can deny this right to any citizen, young or
old, minor or adult, if he is to be tried for a crime
against the eommonwealth.1
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he Bill of Rights applies to every individual within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, irrespective of
age."2 The Supreme Court of the United States is in agreement,
stating in In re Gault3 that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."4 Starting with the
proposition that these constitutional guarantees extend to every-
one regardless of age, the startling fact arises that in only a few
instances have these rights attached in juvenile proceedings. It
was not until the Gault decision, where the first expansive
treatment of the constitutional requirement of due process in
juvenile proceedings was undertaken, that the juvenile received
the benefit of any of the basic constitutional guarantees that
would have been received by an adult who was being tried for
the same offense. The Gault Court held that juvenile delin-
quency proceedings which may lead to commitment in a state
institution must measure up to at least minimum standards of
due process and fair treatment. To meet this requirement, a
juvenile court in such proceedings must provide a juvenile or
his parents or guardian:
1. written notice of the specific charge or allegation
sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit
preparation;
* DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
1. Ex parte Sharpe, 15 Idaho 126,-, 96 P. 563, 564-65 (1908), citing Com-
monwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48,-, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905). This strong argu-
ment was made by the petitioner in seeking the release of his daughter from
the Industrial Training School. The court rejected the plea, holding that the
delinquency determination of a child was not a trial, and therefore there was
no right to a trial by jury.
2. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D.D.C. 1960).
3. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Id. at 13.
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2. representation by counsel, and if the child or his
parents are financially unable to afford counsel,
counsel must be appointed to represent the child;
3. the privilege against self-incrimination; and
4. the right of confrontation and cross-examination in
accordance with constitutional requirements.5
Although Gault went far in integrating due process require-
ments into the juvenile scheme, no determination was made as
to whether the right to a trial by jury attached thereto.6 The
Court did, however, have a later opportunity to consider the
problem of whether a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial. This
opportunity arose in the form of DeBacker v. Brainard, a deci-
sion on appeal from the Nebraska Supreme Court.
In DeBacker, the appellant, a minor 1-7 years of age, was
found to be delinquent by the juvenile court sitting without a
jury and was committed to a training school for boys. A peti-
tion for habeas corpus was dismissed by the district court. On
appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, a majority of four of
the seven judges were of the opinion that the state's juvenile
court act was unconstitutional in that it denied juveniles the
right to a trial by jury. This did not result in the declaration
that the juvenile's right to a jury trial had been violated, for the
Nebraska Constitution required the concurrence of five judges
to hold a legislative act unconstitutional. The court was there-
fore forced into affirming the dismissal.8 On appeal the United
States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that at
the time the case was heard at the juvenile court level, the right
to a trial by jury had not been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment and was not, therefore, applicable to the states.9
5. Id. at 1.
6. The right to trial by jury as herein contained merely refers to the right
guaranteed by the Constitution in amendment six, which would apply to an
adult being charged with the same offense for which the juvenile is being
tried, and in no way proposes to expand such right in any other way. The
sixth amendment right to trial by jury was incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment, and therefore made applicable to the states, by Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18 provides in part:
§18. Trial by jury; witnesses; defence. In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury ....
For the constitutional rights afforded to aliens, see generally Oppenheimer,
The Constitutional Rights of Aliens, 1 BiL OF R GHTS Rav. 100 (1941).
7. 83 Neb. 461, 161 N.W2d 508 (1968); appeal dismissed, 90 S. Ct. 163
(1969).
8. Id.
9. The right to trial by jury was incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment on May 20, 1968, by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). De-
Backer was heard Mar. 28, 1968, less than two months before Duncan.
(Vol. 22
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Since the Supreme Court has not passed on the requirement
of a trial by jury in juvenile proceedings, states will continue to
differ in their approach to this matter. This comment will con-
trast the two prevailing concepts now existing, will show the
position taken by South Carolina, and will attempt to formulate
an approach acceptable in view of current constitutional devel-
opment.
I. PAIxNS PATmAE: A FATm m iN Tm OF NEED
Before 1900, the delinquent was viewed simply as a young
criminal. le was afforded no special treatment and, if con-
victed of the offense with which he was charged, he would
receive the same sentence as would an adult. The turning point
in dealing with juveniles came in 1899 when Illinois adopted
the first juvenile court act.10 Pennsylvania soon followed in
these footsteps by enacting similar legislation.'1 Juvenile court
acts subsequently spread throughout the United States.' 2
These juvenile court acts represented a turning point in the
treatment of wayward youngsters. No longer were they treated
as young criminals; rather, they were regarded as wayward
youths who, because of their age, might be more easily rehabili-
tated than might adult offenders.
Invoking the doctrine of parens patriae the state sought
to rehabilitate rather than punish the youthful of-
fender. Thus, the structure of the juvenile court was
pragmatically oriented toward securing the child's
"best interest." Procedural formalities which prevailed
in the criminal courts-where the state's position was
basically antithetical to the interest of the suspected
criminal-were thought inappropriate in the new in-
stitution, which was intended to cure, rather than to
restrain and deter. Instead, the juvenile court proced-
ures were fashioned so as to accord the judge the great-
est possible opportunity to exercise a quasi-parental
influence over the impressionable child.' 3
The adoption of the paren patriae doctrine by the juvenile
10. Family Court Act Laws, §§ 1-26 [1899] Ill. Laws (repealed 1966).
11. Act of May 21, 1901, Pub. L. No. 279; replaced by Act of April 23,
1903, Pub. L. No. 274.
12. See NATIONAL COUNCIL oF JuvEN= CouRT JuDGEs, DIECrORY AND
MANUAL 1 (1964).
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courts in the several states, while praised by sociologists, led,
however, to an undesirable result; in juvenile proceedings,
juveniles were denied their constitutional rights. These denials
were justified on the theory that, when a juvenile was "im-
prisoned" by a juvenile court, he was not being deprived of his
liberty but was merely being taken into custody for his own
good. 14 This theory can best be illustrated by the following
statement from In re Holbnes :1r
The proceedings in such a court are not in the nature
of a criminal trial but constitute merely a civil inquiry
or action looking to the treatment, reformation and
rehabilitation of the minor child. Their purpose is not
penal, but protective, - aimed to check juvenile de-
linquency and to throw around a child, just starting,
perhaps, on an evil course and deprived of proper
parental care, the strong arm of the State acting as
paren patriae.'('
In adopting this parens patriae theory, the early reformers
were appalled by adult procedure and penalties and by the fact
that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in
jails with hardened criminals. Seeing the hazards that could
result from such procedures, these reformers were convinced
that society's duty to the child could not be accomplished by
traditional concepts of justice alone. Instead of merely deter-
mining whether the child was guilty or innocent, courts should
direct their attention to: "What is he, how has he become what
he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the inter-
est of the state to save him from a downward career."' 7 The
child, as the reformers saw it, must be made "to feel that he is
the object of [the state's] care and solicitude,"' 8 not that he is
under arrest or on trial. Because of these ideas the concept of
criminal law in juvenile proceedings was rejected and in its
place a "clinical approach" adopted. This new approach, socio-
logical in nature, was designed to correct the adverse influences
that were being exerted over the child and to turn him around,
thus preventing him from continuing on his wayward journey.
14. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967).
15. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1955), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
16. Id. at 603, 109 A2d at 525.
17. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. Rsv 104, 119-20 (1909).
18. Id. at 120.
[Vol. 22
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To achieve ,the desired results, the adversary procedure was
rejected and in its place the state acted as parens pathiae.19
In the event that the courts deemed it necessary to deprive
the child of his liberty, this deprivation was rationalized on the
ground that, since a child could be made to respond to his par-
ents and teachers, he had no right to liberty.20 If the parental
authority that was needed by the child was ineffectively admin-
istered, the state could intervene and, if it was deemed neces-
sary, confine the child.
In defense of the parens patiae approach, the argument is
frequently made that juvenile proceedings are not true adver-
sary proceedings, but rather are sui generis and require a flexi-
ble approach.2 1 "The safeguards which surround ... [the juve-
nile] do not inherently derive from the Constitution but from
the social welfare philosophy which forms the historical back-
ground of the Juvenile Court Act."22 This position found sup-
port in W. v. Family Court,23 where the court recognized the
distinct need for a separate type of hearing or trial for minors.
The court observed that the juvenile court system "has had the
singular misfortune of being impaled on the sharp points of a
few hard constitutional cases" 24 such as Ir re Gault 2 5 and Kent
v. United States.26 In requiring that constitutional safeguards
be met, much flexibility and the sound discretion of the judge
are lost. The rationale of this position is that the judge will be
forced to sacrifice his knowledge and experience in the disposi-
tion of juvenile cases to the jury, which will not possess the
same expertise and fatherly insight as would the judge.
South Carolina utilizes the parens patriae concept. Section
19. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 109 (1909) ; Paulsen,
Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
S. CT. REv. 167, 173-74. There seems to have been little early constitutional
objection to the special procedures of juvenile courts. But see Waite, How
Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights,
12 J. Cam. L. & ClImiNOLOGY 339 (1922):
The Court which must direct its procedure even apparently to do
something to a child because of what he has done, is parted from
the court which is avowedly concerned only with doing something
for a child because of what he is and needs, by a gulf too wide to
be bridged by any humanity which the judge may introduce into
his hearings, or by the habitual use of corrective rather than puni-
tive methods after conviction.
20. Id. at 340. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
21. State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969).
22. Id. at 619.
23. 24 N.Y2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
24. Id. at 418, 247 N.E.2d at 256.
25. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
19701
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15-1095.1 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1962 pre-
scribes the approach to be taken by the courts within the state
when dealing with a juvenile.
27
This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end
that families whose unity or well-being is threatened
shall be assisted and protected, and restored if possible
as secure units of law-abiding members; and that each
child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall
receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance
and control that will conduce to his welfare and the
best interests of the State, and that when he is removed
from the control of his parents the court shall secure
for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which they should have given him.
28
The parens patriae concept is further incorporated by Section
15-1095.19 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1962. Sec-
tion 15-1095.19 provides: "All cases of children shall be dealt
with as separate hearings by the court and without a jury. '29
This, apparently, is the system followed in the majority of
jurisdictions.30
IIM. Dun PROCESS: A CuRE Pon THE AuzNG FATnER?
If the state affords a wayward child the necessary amount of
paternal treatment, the question arises, "Why do we have a need
for the constitutional due process requirements?" Perhaps this
can best be answered by a statement by Justice Fortas in Kent:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treat-
ment postulated for children.81
In arguing the need for the right to a trial by jury and the
other constitutional safeguards, the K et Court indicated the
shortcomings of the parms patriae approach:
27. S.C. CODE Axx. § 15-10952(c) (Supp. 1969) provides:
'Child' means a person less than seventeen years of age, where the
child is dealt with as a juvenile delinquent ....
28. S.C. CoDE ANx. § 15-1095.1 (Supp. 1969).
29. Id. at § 15-1095.19.
30. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats
and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 71 (1966).
31. 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966), citing Handler, The Juvenile Court and the
Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. R v. 7.
[Vol. 2
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While there can be no doubt of the original laudible
purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in
recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual
performance measures well enough against theoretical
purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process
from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable
to adults.8 2
The chief reasons given for the failure of the parens pat riae
theory to achieve the desired results are:
1. budgets were not sufficient to draw experienced personnel
into the field;
2. the personnel in the field were drawn away by better
salaries;
3. the judge alone could not untangle the web of subconscious
influences that possessed the troubled youngster;
4. correctional institutions were essentially miniature prisons;
and
5. the secrecy of the proceedings led to some overreaching and
arbitrary actions.
38
Kent and Gault are illustrative of the lack of protection af-
forded an infant in juvenile court. In Kent, the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court waived its exclusive jurisdiction and
authorized the juvenile to be criminally prosecuted in the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, where he was found
guilty. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded to the district court on the issue of waiver. The
Court stated that the order was invalid because of the juvenile
court's failure to grant a hearing, to give counsel access to the
records requested, and to state reasons for its order waiving
jurisdiction.
In Gault, the lack of protection was even more pronounced.
A fifteen year old boy was committed to the Arizona State
Industrial School for the period of his minority. This harsh
sentence of six years, imposed by the state acting as parens
patriae, would not have been imposed upon an adult committing
62. Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 555 (196) ; cf. Harling v. United
States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
33. DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163, 168 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
1970]
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the same offense. Such adult would have been subjected to a
maximum sentence of sixty days.34
These cases went far in integrating due process requirements
into juvenile actions. While neither decided the issue of the
right to a jury trial, some support can be found in DeBacker v.
Br'ainard,13 where two dissenting justices favored such a con-
cept.30 Justice Black characterizes the right to a trial by jury as
one of the fundamental rights of criminal justice. 7 Justice
Douglas stated that he "would reach the merits and hold that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial as
a matter of right where the delinquency charged is an offense
which, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by
jury.
3 8
While the Supreme Court has not passed on the question of
an infant's right to a trial by jury, several lower courts have.
These lower court decisions can usefully be divided into two
categories. First, there are those courts that have felt that the
right to a trial by jury attached in juvenile proceedings. The
courts supporting this view have done so believing that such
right was implicit in GauZt.3 9 Second, there are the courts that
have denied infants the right to a jury trial. These courts have
reasoned that either a trial by jury is not a fundamental right
applicable to the states40 or that such a right is not consistent
with the concept of a juvenile court.
One case that supports the first classification, that of allow-
ing a juvenile the righi to a trial by jury, is Nieves v. United
34. "[J]uvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency', which may lead to
commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes
of the privilege against self-incrimination." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49. The
Gault court made the determination that juvenile proceedings were criminal
when determining the applicability of the right against self-incrimination.
Justice Black appears to be equally convinced that this classification applies to
the right of trial by jury in a juvenile proceeding. DeBacker v. Brainard, 90
S. Ct. 163, 166 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
35. DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
36. Id. at 166, 167.
37. Id. at 166.
38. Id. at 167.
39. Its re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 13.
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), laid this idea to rest by
incorporating the sixth amendment right to trial by jury into the fourteenth
amendment, thus making it applicable to the states.
[Vol. 2
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State. 41 In this case the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act4 2
was declared unconstitutional since it forced a juvenile to choose
between sixth amendment rights and a non-jury trial under the
juvenile act. The court held that the waiver of a jury trial
required by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was uncon-
stitutional because it presented the juvenile offender with an
"impermissible choice" between a non-jury hearing with a maxi-
mum commitment until his twenty-first birthday and the exer-
cise of his right to a trial by jury with the resulting possibility
of a longer sentence.4"
On the other hand several lower courts have denied the juve-
nile a right to a trial by jury. CommonweaUt v. Johnson4 4 was
one case where the court felt that the addition of a jury would
not materially contribute to the fact-finding function of the
court and would seriously limit the court's flexibility in meet-
ing the needs of delinquent children. The court noted that
juvenile proceedings were designed to cure rather than to re-
strain and deter, thus giving the judge the greatest possible
opportunity to exercise quasi-parental influence over the im-
pressionable child.
The most cogent argument for the inapplicability of a jury
trial in juvenile proceedings comes from an article written by
Professor M. G. Paulsen:
A jury trial would inevitably bring a good deal more
formality to the juvenile court without giving a young-
ster a demonstrably better fact finding process than
before a judge. The jury provides the accused with a
weapon against political crimes repressive of civil liber-
ties, a weapon juveniles do not generally need. 45
Although Paulsen appeared to be a leading exponent of non-
41. 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Although this case can be distin-
guished on the grounds that it is a federal case and applies the sixth amend-
ment, this distinction should not lead to a different result as Dunca incorpo-
rated the sixth amendment right to trial by jury into the fourteenth amendment.
See Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968) and In re Rindell, 36
U.S.L.W. 2468 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1968).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964).
43. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (1968).
44. 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967). This case can be distinguished in
that it was decided before Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and
Bloom v. United States, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Accord, Estes v. Hopp, 73
Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); People v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 725,
289 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1968).
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jury proceedings, his position seems to have mellowed to per-
mitting the juvenile to have a trial by jury.
It is probably true that some of the adult protections
that the reformers sought to avoid could be introduced
into the juvenile court without completely hampering
its operation. The right to a jury trial is preserved in
some states and the juvenile courts still function with
jury trials, although, in fact, the right is usually
waived. A constitutional right to a public trial has
rarely been invoked. If a child properly advised by
parents and counsel, wishes a public trial, why should
he not have it? In my view the reformers, in their
desire to distinguish sharply between juvenile and
criminal proceedings and in the hope that children
would be processed as patients in a clinic or given
social education as in a school, put too much emphasis
on the need for informal procedure. The child and his
parents are under no illusion. They know they are in
court, not in school or at a doctor's office.
46
IV. CoNcLusION
Although the sociological approach to treating wayward
youths was praiseworthy, history has indicated its shortcom-
ings. In far too many instances juveniles have been deprived of
their constitutional rights merely through the use of semantics.
Labelling a child a delinquent instead of a criminal may be
thought desirable, but an objective look at the outcome will
reveal the same basic stigma being attached to the youth. As
Justice Musmanno said in In re Holnes: "To say that a grad-
uate of reform school is not to be 'deemed a criminal' is very
praiseworthy but this placid bromide commands no authority in
the fiercely competitive fields of everyday modern life.1
47
States which do not provide the constitutional right to trial
by jury in juvenile proceedings should take a close look to
determine whether they are offering the juvenile the "worst of
both worlds. 1 4 8
Although it may be felt that the parens patriae theory is pro-
viding for the best interests of the child, one should not lose
46. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 S. CT. REv. 167, 186.
47. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 611, 109 A.2d 523, 528-29 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
48. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966).
(Vol. 22
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sight of the fact that legislative reforms, such as juvenile de-
linquency acts, must conform to constitutional mandates.
Perhaps a more efficacious juvenile system could be devised
by utilizing the better concepts of both the parens pahiae ap-
proach and the due process model. This goal could be accom-
plished without sacrificing the bifurcated nature of the juvenile
hearing. At the adjudication stage, the jury would be allowed
to make a determination of delinquency. Once this determina-
tion has been made, the jury's function would be served, and the
judge would then be required to make some disposition of the
child. This system would preserve the desired flexibility and
would allow the judge to utilize the experience and insight
developed by his association with wayward youngsters.
JA~ws L. EDWADS
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